BROOKE GLADSTONE: So, at the Washington Post, there is an established process to determine when and how to tell a secret, without endangering national security. But what about the lone wolves, like William Arkin? In his new book, called Code Names, Arkin discloses and explains some 3,000 military code names, many of them still classified. These are secret names for secret plans and programs, related to weapons agreements with foreign nations, undercover counterinsurgency units or when and how to use American troops on American soil. In his introduction, Arkin writes, "For many, the immediate reaction to this compendium will be anger. You're exposing secrets and endangering America." So, Bill, let's start there. Who died and left you in charge of deciding what's safe and not safe to say?
WILLIAM ARKIN: Well, I think the Constitution came first. [LAUGHTER] I'm an expert on the military, and a longstanding defense analyst. It seemed to me, after 9/11, that not only was there an explosion of secrecy, but the impact of secrecy was made more clear - whether it be in the events of 9/11 itself and the inability of government agencies to talk to each other because of their hoarding of information, whether it was the weapons of mass destruction debate in Iraq, or the exclusion of many people from the war planning process in Iraq, even internally. Secrecy increased. It had an impact on our national security in a very negative way, and since I was in a position to sort of decipher this area, I felt that it would be a little bit duplicitous if I hoarded all of that information, when I was basically arguing that the government should be putting it out. I felt like I had to put it out as well. It was a risk, but it was one that I think was worth taking, and I've had great advice and counsel from retired generals, admirals, others.
BROOKE GLADSTONE: And in your introduction, you list all the wrong reasons that governments keep secrets. "Secrecy," you say, "is used to protect an inflated project budget, to avoid bureaucratic battles, to avoid debate and oversight." Am I missing anything?
WILLIAM ARKIN: Sometimes it's used just to hide the politically sensitive from the American public. Nuclear war preparations, repugnant weapons such as microwave or laser weapons, controversial activities such as torture or domestic intelligence - secrecy essentially to avoid having to debate what it is that we are doing in the name of the American people is the worst type of secrecy, and that is the one that has been growing the most since 9/11.
BROOKE GLADSTONE: Look, you maintain a one of a kind filing cabinet with - it must be thousands of secret documents, and you appear to have emptied virtually all of them into this book. Are you sure, really sure, that you should have let all those cats out of the bag, even the range and magnitude of American nuclear activities?
WILLIAM ARKIN: I am sure. I feel confident after having had the book vetted by knowledgeable former military people, by people on the inside, by legal counsel - some of whom have asked me to make changes - to soften the description. I am sure. And I await the government to dispute that. If the Justice Department or the Defense Department believes that I've compromised US national security, I imagine they'll take legal action. I don't see any move in that direction. The truth of the matter is - these are mostly mundane and trivial secrets, kept for the wrong reasons, and in the history of secrecy, what we have learned is that the more that's secret, the less that's secret, because the real secrets can't be protected within this arcane and Byzantine structure.
BROOKE GLADSTONE: And do you really believe that the publication of code names will actually lead to less secrecy within government - especially within the Bush administration?
WILLIAM ARKIN: Well, I think it will lead to less secrecy immediately, because there are less secrets. [LAUGHTER] They're now in the public domain. So, ipso facto, it's less secrecy. A perfect example was the New York Times story on Sunday about Power Geyser. Power Geyser was one of the code names that I discovered that had to do with the top secret contingency plan for the use of Delta Force in support of a disaster during their inaugural - if there had been a, a, a nuclear attack - Power Geyser would have been implemented, and Delta Force would have been used to protect the presidency and the succession to the presidency. The Defense Department vociferously argued with the New York Times - don't publish the code name - don't publish the information about this - and the times came back to me and said well what do you say - and I say - it's a perfect example of where they're arguing that something is classified, and now, what we really have to ask the question about is - should it be classified? Should the existence of such a contingency plan, without details about what they would do or how they would do it - should the existence of the contingency plans themselves be a secret - and I conclude no, and the New York Times concluded no, and the reality is that the Pentagon sort of acquiesced and basically said we don't comment on classified programs. Now, potentially there can at least be a discussion and a debate about the propriety of using the military for this type of domestic law enforcement function, because that should worry many Americans.
BROOKE GLADSTONE: All right. Bill, thanks very much.
WILLIAM ARKIN: Thank you.
BROOKE GLADSTONE: Journalist and military analyst William Arkin is author of Code Names: Deciphering US Military Plans, Programs and Operations in the 9/11 World. [MUSIC]
